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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of guilt after a jury trial. The state had alleged

in an Information that the defendant hit August "Gus" Wessel, an officer of the Coeur d'Alene City
Police, with a closed fist, knowing or with reason to know he was an officer, and/or because of the
exercise of the officer's official duties. The defendant moved to dismiss the information for failing
to allege the facts essential to establish the offense. The defendant also moved to dismiss the charge
on the basis that LC. § 18-915 is unconstitutionally vague as to what it intends by "duty." The
defendant then withdrew the Motion as to the second argument, recognizing that the infirmity had
been created by Coeur d' Alene's decision to remove duties for its officers, rather than an issue with
the statute. The Court denied the Motion, finding that the state did not need to specify which duty in
the Information, and that the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,844 (2004) found
that peace officers have a community caretaking function arising from their duty to help citizensthereby creating a duty the officer might have been involved in at the time of the incident as revealed
by the preliminary hearing.
At trial, after the state rested, the defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. The
defendant argued that no evidence had been presented that the officer had any duties, and that the
Coeur d'Alene Police had no duties as defined by any legislative body. The Court denied the
Motion, reserving the issue of whether the charge that the defendant had struck the officer due to his
official status for the hearing on jury instructions. The defendant also argued that the state had failed
to provide evidence he had the knowledge or specific intent required. The Court denied that as well.
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At the hearing on jury instructions the defendant objected to the charging and elements
instructions as they failed to specify what duty was intended. The defendant then requested an
instruction that voluntary intoxication may prevent the forming of specific intent. The defendant in
the alternative requested an instruction on unconscious acts. The defendant further requested that the
jury be instructed that battery on certain personnel was a lesser included offense of battery on a law
enforcement officer. The Court denied all of these instructions. The jury convicted the defendant of
Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer. The defendant timely appealed.
B.

Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts
On October 13, 2014, officers of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department arrested Kurtis Kelly

for battery on a law enforcement officer. Tr. p. 3 7, L. 18-25, p. 58, L. 12-16. A preliminary hearing
was held on November 16, 2014. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for vagueness. The
Magistrate denied the Motion, and after an evidentiary hearing, bound the matter over to the District
Court.
The Information filed November 13, 2013, charged:
That the defendant, KURTIS THOMAS KELLY, on or about October 13, 2013, in the
County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully use force and/or violence
upon the person of Gus Wessel, a law enforcement officer employed with the Coeur d'Alene
City Police Department, by hitting him with a closed fist, while Officer Wessel was engaged
in the performance of this [sic] duties and where the Defendant knew or should have known
that Officer Gus Wessel was a peace officer, sheriff, or police officer, or did commit said
battery because of the exercise of Officer Gus Wessel' s official duty, or because of Office
[sic] Wessel [sic] present official status, all of which is contrary to the form, force and effect
-2-

of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People
of the State ofldaho.
On March 21, 2014, the District Court heard the defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss. Tr.
p. 5. The defendant and the state stipulated to a video taken of the incident as the factual basis for
the argument to dismiss on the grounds that LC. § 18-915 is vague as applied. Tr. p. 5, L. 20-25. The
defendant argued that the Information should be dismissed for failing to state the facts sufficiently as
required by Due Process, and that the case should be dismissed on the grounds that the statute itself
was void for vagueness for failing to define the word "duty." Tr. p. 5-21. During the course of the
hearing, the defendant withdrew the latter argument. Tr. p. 21, 12-23. After hearing from both
counsel, the Court denied the Second Motion to Dismiss as to the Information, finding it was
sufficiently pled, and that the preliminary hearing showed the officer was engaged in investigation
and the community caretaking function. Tr. p. 23-27.
On May 28, 2014, the District Court held a trial before a jury in this matter. Tr. p. 28. After
openings, the state called August Wessel. Tr. p. 33. Mr. Wessel testified to being employed as a
police officer with the City of Coeur d'Alene. Tr. p. 34, L. 1-5. Officer Wessel then testified that on
October 16, 2014 at 1:30 he went to a bar in downtown Coeur d'Alene called the Splash to
investigate a fight. Tr. p. 37, L. 5-25. Upon arrival, the officer encountered a large crowd, multiple
police officers, and Kurtis Kelly. Tr. p. 38, L. 1-9, p. 39, L. 25, p. 40, L. 1-4, p. 41, L. 4-10, p. 42, L.
15-19.
The officer found Mr. Kelly in handcuffs, placed upon him by Splash security. Tr. p. 41, L. 510, p. 42, L. 1-11. The officer had the cuffs removed, and proceeded to question witnesses. Tr. p. 42,

L. 1-5, p. 45. L. 1-15. During this period, Mr. Kelly calmed down, then began writhing around
-3-

screaming his date of birth at the top of his lungs repeatedly, and lashing out at those around him. Tr.
p. 43, L. 17-25, p. 44, L. 1-3. Nothing Mr. Kelly screamed was in response to questions. Tr. p. 44, L.
16-18. The officer tried to get him to calm down. Tr. p. 44, L. 21-25. Mr. Kelly's wife was able to
get him to put his shirt and shoes on. Tr. p. 45, L. 20-23. A friend of Mr. Kelly's offered to give him
a ride home. Tr. p. 45, L. 11-15. The officers agreed to assist at the friend and Mr. Kelly's wife's
request. Tr. p. 45, L. 11-15, p. 47, L. 17-19. Officer Wessel explained that the police chose to assist
in Mr. Kelly's removal from the area to protect Mr. Kelly from getting into trouble. Tr. p. 47, L. 716.
Officer Wessel and Officer Carroll physically assisted Mr. Kelly to the friend's car. Tr. p. 47,
L. 1-4. The car was a sedan. Tr. p. 4 7, L. 22-25. On his way to the car, Mr. Kelly complained about

pain in his arm, and not wanting to go to jail. Tr. p. 48, L. 12-25. He also sobbed uncontrollably and
wailed. Tr. p. 49, L. 1-4. He did not resist. Tr. p. 49, L. 23-24. Once at the car, the officers opened
the front passenger door and attempted to convince Mr. Kelly to enter. Tr. p. 50, L. 3-20. Mr. Kelly
continued to cry and yell, and eventually, while being guided into the car by Officer Wessel, reared
up and struck the officer in the face with a closed fist. Tr. p. 50, L. 21-25, p. 51, L. 1-6.
The officers immediately forced Mr. Kelly onto the ground. Tr. p. 55, L. 6-11. Officer
Wessel arrested Mr. Kelly. Tr. p. 55, L. 13-16. Officer Wessel transported Mr. Kelly to the Kootenai
County jail, as Mr. Kelly cried in the back of his vehicle. Tr. p. 58, L. 17-23. At the jail, Mr. Kelly
went unconscious during his extraction from the police cruiser. Tr. p. 60, L. 5-10. Officer Wessel
realized that Mr. Kelly had sustained injury during the earlier take-down, and swelling was forming
around his eye. Tr. p. 60, L. 16-19. The officer chose to take Mr. Kelly to the hospital, and had an
ambulance come for him. Tr. p. 60, L. 22-25, p. 61, L. 1-8.
-4-

The state then entered a video taken from a bodycam on Officer Wessel that had recorded the
entire incident at Splash into evidence and published it to the jury. Tr. p. 66-69; see also Plaintiffs
Exhibit 3. The video showed Mr. Kelly sitting on the ground in handcuffs in front of the bar. It
showed his interaction with the officers and the crowd, and how while at times he seemed to have
some understanding of the world around him, he also would slip in and out, at one point repeating
his birth date, louder and louder, becoming more and more violent. It showed the officers deciding
to have his friends take him home, and the friend requesting the officers assist getting him into her
car. It showed that during the walk to the vehicle and upon arriving at the vehicle, Mr. Kelly was
repeatedly saying, crying, and then screaming that his arm hurt, over and over, right up to the
moment the struck the officer. Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. The state also entered pictures of Officer
Wessel's injuries. Tr. p. 67, L. 7-25; see also Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2. The officer described the
injury as a blood blister and bruise, with a cut on the inside of his lip. Tr. p. 68, L. 13-25.
On cross examination, Officer Wessel testified that at the hospital, Mr. Kelly threatened to
have his father beat up Officer Wessel. Tr. p. 72, L. 16-18.
The state then called Timothy Carroll. Tr. p. 74. After he testified the state rested. Tr. p. 81.
The defendant then moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. After hearing the argument of
the parties, the Court denied the Motion, and found that issues raised by counsel and the Court were
better attended to during the argument on jury instructions. Tr. p. 93, L. 21-25, p. 94, L. 1-16.
The defense called Breanna Sky. Tr. p. 95, L. 1-20. Ms. Breanna testified to being the friend
who had offered her car to take Mr. Kelly home. Tr. p. 103, L. 5-25. Ms. Breanna testified that Mr.
Kelly appeared more intoxicated than he should have been for the amount he had to drink. Tr. p. 99,
L. 12-25, p. 100, L. 1-17.
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The defendant then testified. Tr. p. 113. Mr. Kelly testified eating a meal at five o'clock in
the evening. Tr. p. 115, L. 9-13. At roughly eleven at night, Mr. Kelly, his wife, and her mother
arrived at a bar called the Iron Horse in Coeur d'Alene. Tr. p. 114, L. 10-17, p. 115, L. 17-23.
During the hour they were there, Mr. Kelly drank a gin and tonic. Tr. p. 116, L. 1-5, p. 117, L. 2225, p. 118, L. 1-5. The group then went to a bar called the Beacon, where Mr. Kelly had two further
gin and tonics. Tr. p. 117, L. 10-25. The group then went to Splash, where Mr. Kelly had once
worked. Tr. p. 118, L. 6-11. Mr. Kelly testified he recalled having a shot of a drink called Fireball,
and then beginning to drink another gin and tonic. Tr. p. 118, L. 20-25, p. 119, L. 1-5. At that point
he blacked out, and has no memory of the events described by the other witnesses. Tr. p. 119. Mr.
Kelly testified to awaking the next day in the jail with a nurse. Tr. p. 119, L. 20-22. He testified
further that he had no animus against Officer Wessel and felt awful about the incident. Tr. p. 199, L.
9-17.
The defense then rested. Tr. p. 122, L. 15-18.
The next day, the Court heard argument as to the jury instructions. Tr. Sup. p. 3-25. The
Court overruled the defense's objections to Plaintiffs requested instructions 1 and 2. Tr. Sup. p. 4, L.
23-24, p. 5, L. 17-19. The Court further refused to give Defendant's instructions 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10. Tr.
p. 9, L. 22-25, p. 10, L. 1-3, p. 17, L. 8-20, p. 20, L. 14-25, p. 21, L. 13-15, 16-25, p. 22, L. 12-21, p.
24, L. 13-18. After the jury was instructed and heard the arguments of counsel, it returned a verdict
of guilty.
The District Court entered its judgment of the defendant on July 17, 2014.
The defendant timely appealed from the District Court's judgment.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the state must indicate in the Information the duty in which the officer was
engaged or for which he/she was struck.

II.

Whether the state must present evidence as to the duty in which the officer was
engaged or for which he/she was struck.

III.

Whether the elements instruction must indicate the duty in which the officer was
engaged or for which he/she was struck that the jury is to find.

IV.

Whether the officers of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department have any duties within
the meaning ofl.C. § 18-915.

V.

Whether the judiciary may create the duties of the police for purposes of I.C. § 18915.

VI.

Whether I.C. § 18-116 is unconstitutional under the Article I § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution in so far as it reduces the state's burden to prove particular crimes in
cases involving specific intent and voluntary intoxication.

VII.

Whether I.C. § 18-116 also reduces the defense's burden to present a self-defense
claim.

VIII.

Whether Battery on Certain Personnel is a lesser included offense of Battery on a
Police Officer.

-7-

ARGUMENT
I.

A.

Introduction
The District Court erred in denying the defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss the

Information in this matter for failing to explicitly state which duty Officer Wessel was conducting at
the time of the battery.
B.

Standard of Review
Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law, over which an appellate court

exercises free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757 (2004). Whether a charging document
conforms to the requirements oflaw and is legally sufficient is also a question oflaw subject to free
review. Id.
C.

The Information must have stated explicitly which duty the state intended.
The State's failure to allege the facts surrounding their allegation deprives the District Court

of jurisdiction over the charge. "If an alleged deficiency is raised by a defendant before trial or entry
of a guilty plea, in order to survive the challenge, the charging document must be found to set forth
all facts essential to establish the charged offense." State v. Stewart-lvfeyers, 145 Idaho 605,606 (Ct.
App. 2008). An indictment is jurisdictionally defective "when the alleged facts are not made
criminal by statute, or where there is a failure to state facts essential to establish the offense
charged." Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739 (Ct.App.1987). In a criminal case, the filing of an
Information alleging that an offense was committed within the State ofldaho confers subject matter
jurisdiction. Jones, 140 Idaho 755at 757-58. Because the information provides subject matter
jurisdiction to the district court, the district court's jurisdictional power depends on the charging
document being legally sufficient to survive challenge. Id. at 758. There are two standards to
- 8-

consider. Id. First, there is the question of whether an indictment or information is legally sufficient
for the purpose of due process during proceedings in the trial court. Id. Second, there is the separate
question of whether an indictment or information is legally sufficient for the purpose of imparting
jurisdiction. Id.
If the information fails to describe the offense with such particularity so as to serve as a shield
in the event of a second prosecution for the same offense, such information is insufficient for
purposes of Article I§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. State v. Grady, 89 Idaho 204, 209 (1965) citing State v. Bowman, 40 Idaho 470
(1925); State v. Lottridge, 29 Idaho 53 (1916); State v. O'Neil, 24 Idaho 582 (1913). The Court in

Grady quoted 4 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 1762 (1957) for the following test:
'The constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him requires that every material fact and essential element of the
offense be charged with precision and certainty in the indictment or information. He
has a substantive right to be informed by the indictment or information in simple,
understandable language of the crime he is charged with and the acts constituting the
crime, in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense and to be protected in
the event of double jeopardy, and to define the issues so that the court will be able to
determine what evidence is admissible, and to pronounce judgment.'
In this case, the state failed to allege all of the facts essential to set forth the charge for
purposes of Due Process. The Information set forth the defendant's name and a date and then stated
that he allegedly hit Officer Gus Wessel of the Coeur d'Alene City Police with a close fist, knowing
or with reason to know he was an officer, because of the exercise of the officer's official duties. The
State fails to identify the key fact: what duty the officer was exercising. Without alleging all of the
facts essential to allow the defendant to know what duty the state will prove, the state failed to
provide the District Court with subject matter jurisdiction to proceed on the claim. The Petition
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lacks the "factual specificity adequate to 'enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended' and to shield against double jeopardy." Jones, 140 Idaho at 758 quoting Grady, 89 Idaho at
208-209.
The District Court held that the Information was constitutionally sound because the
preliminary hearing showed that the duty was the community caretaking function, and whether the
officer was engaged in that duty could be ascertained by the finder of fact. The Court's ruling was
incorrect. In State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 927-28 (Ct.App.1997), the Court of Appeals held that
the information was constitutionally insufficient for failing to allege the method and manner in
which a theft took place. However, the Court found that prejudice was lacking because the defendant
had the opportunity to see the details of the allegations at the preliminary hearing. Id.
This case differs from Owen because rather than failing to provide the method and manner,
the state failed to state what specific duty or duties were occurring. As the Court of Appeals held in

State v. Hallenbeck, 141 Idaho 596, 599-600 (Ct.App.2005):
Applying that definition of "duty," we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for
a jury finding that Hallenbeck resisted, delayed or obstructed Deputy Lehman in the
performance of a duty of his office. We begin by noting that although Hall en beck's
argument on appeal assumes that his only conduct at issue was his failure to comply
with Lehman's final orders to return to his car, neither the charging citation nor the
jury instructions limited the charge to that conduct. The citation alleged that
Hallenbeck resisted and obstructed an officer by "fail[ing] to obey commands to get
back into his car." And the jury instruction stating the elements of the offense
instructed in the general language of the statute and did not identify the specific act or
acts that were alleged to constitute the violation. Therefore, the jury could have found
Hallenbeck guilty either for his conduct after the citation was issued or for his earlier
behavior in attempting to exit the car by pushing the door open against Lehman's
body despite the deputy's repeated instructions to close the door and stay in the car.
This conduct, which resulted in a shoving match at the door between Hallenbeck and
the deputy, occurred during what Hallenbeck concedes to be a lawful segment of the
detention, before the deputy concluded the traffic stop. It is beyond dispute that
during a traffic stop, an officer has the authority to control the movement of the
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driver of the stopped vehicle. See Pennsylvania v..Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977);
State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 131 (Ct.App.2002) ("During a lawful traffic stop,
the officer may instruct the driver to exit the vehicle or to remain inside. The
procedure is within the police officer's discretion and is not otherwise unlawful."). It
is also clear that Hallenbeck's acts of making physical contact and struggling with the
officer are sufficient to sustain a conviction under the statute. See State v. Wight, 117
Idaho 604, 607 (Ct.App.1990) (During a pat down search occurring during a traffic
stop, the defendant's "reaction in pushing the officer constituted sufficient grounds to
arrest him for obstructing and delaying."). Thus, the jury could have based its
conviction on Hallenbeck's actions of attempting to exit his vehicle in contravention
of Lehman's initial lawful order to get back in his vehicle and repeated lawful orders
to remain in his vehicle.
As the Court of Appeals articulates, simply instructing that some "duty" was ongoing leaves a wide
open question as to what conduct of the officer the state is alleging was the "duty" the state is
seeking to prove was linked to the battery. The defendant has a right to know which duty the state
intended to prove at trial, both so that he may defend himself, and to guard against being retried. The
information therefore failed to provide sufficient notice of the factual allegation in violation of the
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I § 13 of
the Idaho Constitution.
This Court should reverse the findings of the District Court and dismiss so much of the
information as alleged that the defendant committed a felony battery on an officer by striking the
officer while he was on duty or because of the officer's duty.

II.
A.

Introduction
The District Court erred in denying the defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. The

Court failed to consider that the state had provided not only no evidence that at the time of the
striking that the defendant had any particular intention, but in fact introduced evidence that is
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contrary to such an assertion, i.e., that the defendant, as shown in the video, had ceased to be
cognizant of the world around him. Further, the state did not, because it could not, provide any
evidence as to Mr. Wessel's duties as a police officer with the Coeur d'Alene Police.
B.

Standard of Review
Where a trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence

upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find the essential elements of a crime established beyond
a reasonable doubt, those finding will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53,
58 (Ct.App.1998). An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Idaho v. Button,
134 Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000).
C. The state failed to present any evidence as to the defendant's mens rea.
A motion for acquittal should only be granted where there is no evidence produced at trial to
support the conviction. State v. Griffith, 127 Idaho 8, 11 (1995). The District Court erred in ruling
that the state had introduced evidence as to the defendant's knowledge and intent. I.C. § 18-915
states in pertinent part:
(3) For committing a violation of the provisions of section 18-903, Idaho Code,
except unlawful touching as described in section 18-903(b), Idaho Code, against the
person of a former or present peace officer, sheriff or police officer:
(a) Because of the exercise of official duty or because of the victim's former or
present official status; or
(b) While the victim is engaged in the performance of his duties and the person
committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that such victim is a peace
officer, sheriff or police officer;
the offense shall be a felony punishable by imprisonment in a correctional facility for
a period of not more than five (5) years, and said sentence shall be served
consecutively to any sentence being currently served.
Subpart (b) appears to require only that the defendant have knowledge that the victim is a law
enforcement officer, however, that is not all the mens rea required. In 1893, the United States
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Supreme Court held in Pettibone v. U.S., 148 U.S. 197 (1893):
[i]t seems clear that an indictment against a person for corruptly, or by threats or
force, endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede a witness or officer in a court
of the United States in the discharge of his duty, must charge knowledge or notice,
or set out facts that show knowledge or notice, on the part of the accused that the
witness or officer was such; and the reason is no less strong for holding that a person
is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration of
justice in a court unless it appears that he knew or had notice that justice was
being administered in such court. Section 5399 is a reproduction of section 2 of the
act of congress of March 2, 1831, c. 99, (4 St. p. 487,) 'declaratory of the law
concerning contempts of court,' though proceeding by indictment is not exclusive if
the offense of obstructing justice be committed under such circumstances as to bring
it within the power of the court, under section 725. In maters [sic] of contempt,
persons are not held liable for the breach of a restraining order or injunction unless
they know or have notice, or are chargeable with knowledge or notice, that the writ
has been issued or the order entered, or at least that application is to be made; but
without service of process, or knowledge or notice or information of the pendency of
proceedings, a violation cannot be made out.
Undoubtedly it is a condition of penal laws that ignorance of them constitutes no
defense to an indictment for their violation, but that rule has no application here. The
obstruction of the due - 13 -dministration [sic] of justice in any court of the United
States, corruptly or by threats or force, is indeed made criminal, but such obstruction
can only arise when justice is being administered. Unless that fact exists the statutory
offense cannot be committed, and while, with knowledge or notice of that fact, the
intent to offend accompanies obstructive action, without such knowledge or notice
the evil intent is lacking. It is enough that the thing is done which the statute forbids,
provided the situation invokes the protection of the law, and the accused 1s
chargeable with knowledge or notice of the situation; but not otherwise.

It is insisted, however, that the evil intent is to be found, not in the intent to violate
the United States statute, but in the intent to commit an unlawful act, in the doing of
which justice was in fact obstructed, and that, therefore, the intent to proceed in the
obstruction of justice must be supplied by a fiction oflaw. But the specific intent to
violate the statute must exist to justify a conviction, and, this being so, the
doctrine that there may be a transfer of intent in regard to crimes flowing from
general malevolence has no applicability. It is true that, if the act in question is a
natural and probable consequence of an intended wrongful act, then the unintended
wrong may derive its character from the wrong that was intended; but, if the
unintended wrong was not a natural and probable consequence of the intended
wrongful act, then this artificial character cannot be ascribed to it, as a basis of guilty
intent. The element is wanting through which such quality might be imparted.
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[emphasis added]
Id. at 206 citing Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267(1889); Winslow v. Nayson, 113 Mass. 411 (1873); 1
Bish. Crim. Law,§ 335; 2 Daniell, Ch. Pr. (4 th Amer. Ed.) 1684; 2 High, Inj. (3d Ed.)§§ 1421, 1452.
Thus, the Constitution prohibits finding a person guilty of obstructing an officer in the discharge of
their duty where the defendant does not know both that the person is an officer and that he is doing
his duty. The state must show that the person in question recognized the officer's actions as part of
their duty. See also 2008 Idaho Laws Ch. 151 (S.B. 1362) (Statement of Purpose). Therefore, the
state in this case must have shown that the defendant was aware of the fact that Wessel was an
officer doing his duty, or aware that he was an officer and struck him due to his duty.
The state's case is best illustrated by its Exhibit 3, the video from the officer's bodvcam. The
only basis upon which a reasonable person, after watching that video, could say that there was
evidence that the defendant even knew who he was at the time of the striking, is by declaring that
mens rea is not necessary to prove this charge. And, indeed, that is precisely what occurred in this
case.
The state argued on the basis of Exhibit 3, the video, that the defendant had stated as he was
being put in the car, "I don't want to be arrested. I don't want to go to jail." Tr. p. 90, L. 10-19. But
that recitation of the facts is inaccurate. As a review of Exhibit 3 shows, after initially being picked
up off the ground by the officers, the defendant made a statement about jail. However, during the
walk to the car he had been repeating over and over that his arm hurt, and as they attempted to get
him to sit in the vehicle, his episode reached a rather violent climax. Prior to the walk to the car, the
video shows the defendant had been going in and out of consciousness throughout the incident. He
had earlier shown the same behavior of repeating something as he grew violent. He had repeated his
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birth date, louder and louder, becoming more and more violent, evidently unaware of what was going
on around him.
The Court, however, did not require the state prove that the defendant was aware. The state
simply argued that whether the defendant's intoxication was involuntary was for the jury to
determine. Tr. p. 88, L. 21-23. As will be argued below in part III.C., the state may not use voluntary
intoxication is as a sword to cut out elements of crimes and vilify people for actions they committed
while wholly unaware of their surroundings. The Court allowed the state to "prove" a terrible crime,
a crime deeply related to the character and morality of the defendant, without actually having to
produce any evidence as to the defendant's state of mind at the time the punch was thrown beyond
intoxication. A young man who has no hostility toward anyone, much less the police, while sober,
was convicted of a heinous crime intended to punish those who take revenge on the police for doing
their job. See 2001 Idaho Laws Ch. 181 (H.B. 65) (Statement of Purpose). The conviction should be
reversed.
D. The state failed to present any evidence as to Officer Wessel's duties.
The District Court erred in finding the state had provided any evidence Officer Wessel was
engaged in an official duty at the time of the striking or struck because of exercise of his duties. The
state made no attempt at articulating what duty was involved in this matter. It may have relied on the
fact that LC. § 18-915 and the model jury instruction ICJI 12121 provide no definition. However,
simply leaving the concept of"duty" in LC. § 18-915 open would provide no direction whatsoever to
ordinary citizens or those who must enforce the law. In Coates v. City ofCincinnati, 402 U.S. 611
(1971) the United States Supreme Court addressed a law which had criminal penalties. There, the
city ordinance made it a criminal offense for "'three or more persons to assemble... on any of the
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sidewalks .. and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by ... "' Coates,
402 U.S. at 611. The defendants challenged the ordinance asserting that it, "on its face violates the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution." Coates, 402 U.S. at 612 (citation omitted).
Reviewing the words of the ordinance, the Court found that the law was unconstitutionally vague:
[c ]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is
vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an
imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no
standard of conduct is specified at all. As a result, 'men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning.' Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
U.S. 385,391 [1926].
Id. at 614. The Court went on to hold that a city may regulate conduct through an ordinance
"directed with reasonable specificity toward the conduct prohibited" and not through "an ordinance
whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed." Id.; see, also,
Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (recognizing that where "there are no
standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and
encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law.")
The issue before this Court is what the legislature intended by the use of the word "duty" and
"official duty" in LC. § 18-915. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this
Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction, State v.
Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999), and the words of the statute are to be given their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning, State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001). Duty is defined by MerriamWebster as:
1

: conduct due to parents and superiors
2

a: obligatory tasks, conduct, service, or functions that arise from one's position (as in
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life or in a group)
b (]): assigned service or business (2): active military service (3): a period of being
on duty
3
a: a moral or legal obligation
b: the force of moral obligation
4
: tax; especially: a tax on imports
5
a: work la
b (]): the service required (as of an electric machine) under specified conditions (2):
functional application: use <got double duty out of the trip> (3): use as a substitute
<making the word do duty for the thing - Edward Sapir>
Merriam-Webster, Inc. (2013) available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/duty (last
visited November 16, 2013). Thus, the crux of duty is actions which one is obliged to perform.
However, law enforcement does not have "duties" as that concept is commonly understood.
As the Supreme Court held in Town ofCastle Rock, Colo. V Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-2 (2005)
(footnotes omitted):
A well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently
mandatory arrest statutes.
"In each and every state there are long-standing statutes that, by their terms, seem to
preclude nonenforcement by the police.... However, for a number of reasons,
including their legislative history, insufficient resources, and sheer physical
impossibility, it has been recognized that such statutes cannot be interpreted
literally .... [T]hey clearly do not mean that a police officer may not lawfully decline
to ... make an arrest. As to third parties in these states, the full-enforcement statutes
simply have no effect, and their significance is further diminished." 1 ABA Standards
for CriminalJustice 1-4.5, commentary, pp. 1-124 to 1-125 (2d ed.1980)(footnotes
omitted).
The deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion, even in the presence of
seemingly mandatory legislative commands, is illustrated by Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41 (1999), which involved an ordinance that said a police officer" 'shall order'
"persons to disperse in certain circumstances, id., at 47, n. 2. This Court rejected out
of hand the possibility that "the mandatory language of the ordinance ... afford[ed]
the police no discretion." Id., at 62, n. 32. It is, the Court proclaimed, simply
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"common sense that all police officers must use some discretion in deciding when
and where to enforce city ordinances." Ibid. (emphasis added).
Against that backdrop, a true mandate of police action would require some stronger
indication from the Colorado Legislature than "shall use every reasonable means to
enforce a restraining order" (or even "shall arrest ... or ... seek a warrant"), §§ 18-6803.5(3)(a), (b ). That language is not perceptibly more mandatory than the Colorado
statute which has long told municipal chiefs of police that they "shall pursue and
arrest any person :fleeing from justice in any part of the state" and that they "shall
apprehend any person in the act of committing any offense ... and, forthwith and
without any warrant, bring such person before a .. . competent authority for
examination and trial." Colo.Rev.Stat.§ 31-4-112 (Lexis 2004). It is hard to imagine
that a Colorado peace officer would not have some discretion to determine thatdespite probable cause to believe a restraining order has been violated-the
circumstances of the violation or the competing duties of that officer or his agency
counsel decisively against enforcement in a particular instance. The practical
necessity for discretion is particularly apparent in a case such as this one, where the
suspected violator is not actually present and his whereabouts are unknown. Cf
Donaldson v. Seattle, 65 Wash.App. 661, 671-672 (1992) ("There is a vast difference
between a mandatory duty to arrest [a violator who is on the scene] and a mandatory
duty to conduct a follow up investigation [to locate an absent violator] .... A
mandatory duty to investigate ... would be completely open-ended as to priority,
duration and intensity").
Such an understanding of obligation does not square easily with society's or for that matter the
common law's understanding of duty. Generally at law duty gives rise to liability where the person
with the duty fails to live up to it. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW,
Torts- Trespass and Negligence (1881 ). Yet that rule evidently does not apply to a police officer, at
least in terms of the functions of his office, including those one might reasonably assume are his
duties. Without more direction from the legislature, LC.§ 18-915 does not appear to apply to any
conduct an officer engages in.
Thus, turning to the possible authorities from whence an officer's duties might come, this
Court will find that Wessel does not, in fact, have any. To have a criminal law that creates liability
on the basis of whatever an officer is obliged to perform by his supervisor in the executive branch
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would have to be unconstitutional. The duties of the executive branch are set by the legislature and
the Idaho Constitution. See IDAHO CONST. art. II § 1, art. III § 1, art. IV § 1 ("They shall perform such
duties as are prescribed by this Constitution and as may be prescribed by law, provided that the state
controller shall not perform any post-audit functions."). As a municipal office, the Coeur d'Alene
Police may have other duties as created by their municipality, but not by the police office itself. See
IDAHO CONST. art. XII§ 2; LC. § 50-201 et seq. An individual officer or deputy may then take on
certain duties of his superior officer, so long as they were first prescribed by the city council or
whatever municipal body makes law. See United State v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241,245 (2nd Cir. 1967)
(" 'Engaged in ... performance of official duties' is simply acting within the scope of what the agent
is employed to do. The test is whether the agent is acting within that compass or is engaging in a
personal frolic of his own.").
The defendant would also draw the Court's attention to the treatment of law enforcement
duties in neighboring states. In California, all law enforcement have their duties detailed in
Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 830.1. The Montana Legislature actually defined the duties of an officer
within its obstructing statute. MCA 45-7-302. The Washington legislature leaves the creation of
local peace officer duties to the local city council. RCWA 35.23.440(30).
Similarly, the Idaho state legislature has provided for duties for sheriffs in this state in the
form of I. C. § 31-2202.

The Idaho Legislature has however chosen to leave to its various

municipalities the prerogative to provide their police departments with duties. See Idaho Const. Art.
XII§ 2; J.C.§ 31-2227. The city of Coeur d'Alene which employs Wessel as an officer once had an
ordinance that set forth standards for peace officers, but repealed it in 2001. See Coeur d'Alene Ord.
203 2 § 1. That removed any basis for claiming that Wessel' s conduct at issue here was that to which
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he was bound by "duty." No Coeur d'Alene Police Officer has any duties within the meaning of the
law.
The courts ofldaho have attempted to define duty on their own. The Court of Appeals held
in State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 179 ( 1988), that duties of an officer that are:
many and varied. See LC. § 31-2202 (setting forth duties of sheriffs). In particular,
Idaho Code § 49-3608 vests authorized officers ,vith the power to remove abandoned
vehicles to a place of safety, although arguably not in the manner pursued by Taylor
in the instant case. See LC. § 49-3619. In addition, our Supreme Court has
recognized a police officer's "community caretaking function," which is divorced
from the investigative function. Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817 (1988). See Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
While the Court of Appeals correctly looked to the law to define duty, it erred in holding that
judicially recognized "functions" of police used by courts to forgive violations of defendants'
constitutional rights somehow carried over to determining what an officer's duties are. The Court of
Appeals held thereby that it could, by judicial fiat, impose a definition and thus criminal liability
where none existed. "Criminal statutes must be strictly construed." State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320,
325 ( 1990) citing State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 29, 153 (1989); Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107
Idaho 688, 690 (1984) (overruled on other grounds, Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166
(1990)); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430,437 (1980); State v. Alkire, 79 Idaho 334,338 (1957).
As the Court of Appeals held in State v. Herren, 2012 WL 5464517 at *4 (Ct.App.2012) ajf'd in
relevant part 2014 WL 6897182 (Idaho 2014):
although the Legislature may not have consciously intended to exclude the activity at
issue in this case, that is exactly what it did by its choice of language, and we are
constrained by adherence to our rules of statutory construction to give effect to the
plain language of the statute. Indeed, there is an argument that had the Legislature
intended the interpretation urged by the State, it would have stated in the statute that
any violation of an NCO could form the basis of the offense, as opposed to explicitly
requiring "contact" in violation of an NCO. See, e.g., I.C. § 18-7905 (defining first
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degree stalking as, inter alia, a violation of Idaho Code § 18-7906 and where the
"actions constituting the offense are in violation of a temporary restraining order,
protection order, no contact order or injunction, or any combination thereof'). [italics
in original]
Similarly in the case of LC.§ 18-915, the courts are constrained to apply the law as written, not
legislate from the bench. In the words of Chief Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit:
We should of course yield to the text, when the text is plain, but 'good order' is a
word of vague content; particularly when used as an alternate to 'good moral
character.' If it be answered that this bases our construction on our personal judgment
of the public importance of the conduct involved, we agree. Not infrequently a
legislature means to leave to the judges the appraisal of some of the values at stake.
For example, those rights, criminal and civil, that are measured by what is
'reasonable,' really grant to courts such a 'legislative' power, although we call the
issues questions of fact. They require of the judges the compromise that they think in
accord with the general purposes of the measure as the community would understand
it. We are of course aware of the resulting uncertainties involved in such an
interpretation; but the alternative would be specifically to provide for each situation
that can arise, a substitute utterly impractical in operation. We can say no more than
that we think it plain that this statute did not mean to make naturalization depend
upon obedience to such a regulation as that before us. We call this function
'interpretation,' so long as the scope of the appraisal and choice is not too wide;
although when it is too wide, we call the statute invalid, as a 'delegation' of
legislative power. [emphasis added]

Yin-Shing Woo v. US., 288 F.2d 434 (1961). The word "duty" in LC.§ 18-915 is, in the words of
the Chief Judge, too wide for judicial interpretation. Further, where the legislature itself has already
set about to passing laws defining those duties at the state level, one can only assume that the
legislature was leaving the duties of city police to be set by local democratic bodies, not the courts.

See IDAHO CONST. art. II,§ 1; art. Ill§§ 1, 15; see, e.g., Post Falls Code 2.08.070.
To conclude, this Court may wish that the City of Coeur d'Alene or the Idaho Legislature had
simply adopted statute defining duty within the context of LC. § 18-915 similar to the English
common law:
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An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice on his way to, in, or returning from
the execution of the duty of arresting, keeping in custody, or imprisoning any person
whom he is lawfully entitled to arrest, keep in custody, or imprison, or the duty of
keeping the peace or dispersing an unlawful assembly, provided that the offender has
notice that the person killed is such an officer so employed.
Sir James Stephen, DIGEST OF CRIMINAL LA w xxi. 28 ( 1878). But it did not. "It would certainly be
dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to
the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large."

United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,221 (1875). That, unfortunately, is the state ofl.C. § 18-915 as
applied to the officers of Coeur d'Alene. Even if there were some duty that does exist, then the
Court erred because the state failed to provide any evidence of it, much less name it, or provide
evidence that the officer was presently engaged in it. Accordingly, the District Court erred in not
directing that a verdict of acquittal be entered to so much of the charge as alleged that the officer was
engaged in his duty or that the defendant battered the officer because of his duty at the end of the
state's evidence.
III.

A. Introduction
The District Court erred in instructing the jury. The Court erred in not holding that LC. § 18116 unconstitutionally reduced the state's burden in this case, essentially allowing it to prove
misdemeanor battery on certain personnel but receive a conviction for felony battery on law
enforcement. The Court also erred in holding that the defendant was not entitled to an unconscious
act instruction or to a self-defense instruction. The Court further erred in holding that battery on
certain personnel is not a lesser included offense of battery on a police officer.
B. Standard of Review
The question whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question oflaw over which an
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appellate court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 14 7 Idaho 694,710 (2009). When reviewing
jury instructions, an appellate court asks whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually,
fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942 (Ct.App.1993).
Whether a statute is constitutional is a question oflaw. State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756
(2001 ). Thus, an appellate court exercises de novo review. Id.
An appellate court exercises free review over a trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction
regarding a lesser included offense. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 373-74 (2002). Whether a
particular crime is a lesser included offense of the crime charged involves a question of law over
which an appellate court exercises free review. State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 726 (1993); State v.

Curtis, 130 Idaho 525, 527 (Ct.App.1996).
C. The jury must be instructed as to which of the officer's duties it is supposed to find the officer
was engaged in or on account of which the defendant allegedly struck him.
The District Court, having denied that the particular duty of the officer need be specified in
the Information or for that matter even suggested by the evidence, then refused to require any
specification as to "duty" in state's requested jury instructions No. 1 and 2. It is error for a trial court
to give an instruction that misstates the law or is misleading. State v. Dudley, 137 Idaho 888, 890
(Ct.App.2002); State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 564 (Ct.App.1993). It is also error to provide a
vague or ambiguous instruction. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 364-6~ (2012).
In this case, the Court left it to the jury to determine what "duty" referred to in the elements
instruction. In 1927, the Supreme Court faced a similar issue when it decided Jakeman v. Oregon

Short Line R. Co., 43 Idaho 505 (1927). In that case, the Court held:
The court instructed the jury, instruction No. 17 (assignments of error 23, 24, 25, 26,
and 27), in the words of section 4820 of the Idaho Compiled Statutes, which section
pertains to the sounding of bell or whistle and by such instruction failed to specify
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that there was no duty imposed, at least upon the brakeman, and, we might likewise
say, upon the conductor.
The verdict ran against all five defendants, and owing to the sphinx like silence of the
record as to the duties of at least the brakeman and fireman, of course no negligence
of any kind having been proven as against these two defendants, the judgment as to
each of them must be reversed.

Id. at 91. Presumably, if the silence of the sphinx will not do for finding negligence, it is hardly a
good basis for finding a felony.
For the reasons stated in Part IL D. of this brief, the instruction was vague and ambiguous and
thereby violated the defendant's right to Due Process, therefore his conviction must be reversed.
D. LC.§ 18-116 unconstitutionally reduces the state's burden under the Due Process standards of
the Idaho Constitution, Article I § 13.
It is fundamental that the constitutional guarantee of due process requires that the government
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
( 1970). A statutory presumption that is mandatory, i.e., that is conclusive proof of an element of the
crime or that requires the accused to present rebuttal evidence thereby shifting the burden of proof, is
unconstitutional. State v. Hebner, l 08 Idaho 196, 200 ( 1985). At issue in this case was whether the
defendant's level of intoxication rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea, and if so,
whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury that it could only take that into account if it
found the intoxication to be "involuntary."
The District Court erred in this case in upholding the Idaho Legislature's enactment of LC. §
18-116, and thereby denying the defendant's requested jury instructions No. 3 and 10. Idaho's
statute now states:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his conduct
and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense and may not be taken into
consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of
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the offense unless the defendant proves that he did not know that it was an
intoxicating substance when he consumed, smoked, sniffed, injected or otherwise
ingested the substance causing the condition.
Prior to the amendment, diminished capacity from intoxication could negate intent elements. See

State v. Lopez, 126 Idaho 831, 833-34 (Ct.App.1995). By refusing to acknowledge that intoxication
can render a person unable to form certain mental states, Idaho's statute violates reality, reduces the
burden placed on the state to prove specific intent crimes, and prevents a defendant from providing a
legitimate defense. The statute was amended in 1997, after the Supreme Court of the United States
held that there was no federal constitutional guarantee to an "intoxication defense." Montana v.

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 3 7, 56 (1996). To call voluntary intoxication a "defense" is not entirely accurate;
rather what was truly at issue was whether voluntary intoxication was relevant to whether the
defendant in Egelhoffhad the required mens rea.
In Egelhoff Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, held:
"The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress
have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension
between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral,
philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment
has always been thought to be the province of the States." Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 535-536 (1968) (plurality opinion). The people of Montana have decided to
resurrect the rule of an earlier era, disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication
when a defendant's state of mind is at issue. Nothing in the Due Process Clause
prevents them from doing so, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana to
the contrary must be reversed.

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 56. Essentially, the Supreme Court held that due to a historical period of
scientific ignorance laws that are now clearly without basis in fact or reason are acceptable under the
United States Constitution, in spite of its holding in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence goes further, essentially holding that a state can do whatever it
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pleases in determining what the mens rea for a crime will be:
Comprehended as a measure redefining mens rea, § 45-2-203 encounters no
constitutional shoal. States enjoy wide latitude in defining the elements of criminal
offenses, particularly when determining "the extent to which moral culpability should
be a prerequisite to conviction of a crime," When a State's power to define criminal
conduct is challenged under the Due Process Clause, we inquire only whether the law
"offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." Defining mens rea to eliminate the
exculpatory value of voluntary intoxication does not offend a "fundamental principle
of justice," given the lengthy common-law tradition, and the adherence of a
significant minority of the States to that position today.

Id. at 58-59 citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,232 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
201-202 (1977); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,545, (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
The dissent in Egelhoff stated the truth of what the plurality had allowed:
A State's placement of a significant limitation on the right to defend against the
State's accusations "requires that the competing interest be closely examined."
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,295 (1973). Montana has specified that to
prove guilt, the State must establish that the defendant acted purposely or knowingly,
but has prohibited a category of defendants from effectively disputing guilt through
presentation of evidence relevant to that essential element. And the evidence is
indisputably relevant: The Montana Supreme Court held that evidence of intoxication
is relevant to proof of mental state, 272 Mont., at 122-123, 900 P.2d, at 265, and
furthermore, § 45-2-203's exception for involuntary intoxication shows that the
legislature does consider intoxication relevant to mental state. Montana has barred
the defendant's use of a category of relevant, exculpatory evidence for the express
purpose of improving the State's likelihood of winning a conviction against a certain
type of defendant. The plurality's observation that all evidentiary rules that exclude
exculpatory evidence reduce the State's burden to prove its case, ante, at 2023, is
beside the point. The purpose of the familiar evidentiary rules is not to alleviate the
State's burden, but rather to vindicate some other goal or value- e.g., to ensure the
reliability and competency of evidence or to encourage effective communications
within certain relationships. Such rules may or may not help the prosecution, and
when they do help, do so only incidentally. While due process does not "ba[r] States
from making changes ... that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to
obtain convictions," McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. [79,] 89, n. 5 [1986]
(emphasis added), an evidentiary rule whose sole purpose is to boost the State's
likelihood of conviction distorts the adversary process. Cf. Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 25 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurrmg in result). Unlike Chambers and
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Washington, where the State at least claimed that the evidence at issue was
unreliable, Montana does not justify its rule on grounds such as that intoxication
evidence is unreliable, cumulative, privileged, or irrelevant. The sole purpose for this
disallowance is to keep from the jury's consideration a category of evidence that helps
the defendant's case and weakens the government's case.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 68. The Court should also look to Justice Breyer's dissent:
I join Justice O'CONNOR's dissent. As the dissent says, and as Justice SOUTER
agrees, the Montana Supreme Court did not understand Montana's statute to have
redefined the mental element of deliberate homicide. In my view, however, this
circumstance is not simply happenstance or a technical matter that deprives us of the
power to uphold that statute. To have read the statute differently-to treat it as if it had
redefined the mental element-would produce anomalous results. A statute that makes
voluntary intoxication the legal equivalent of purpose or knowledge but only where
external circumstances would establish purpose or knowledge in the absence of
intoxication, see ante, at 2024 (GINSBURG, J., concurring), is a statute that turns
guilt or innocence not upon state of mind, but upon irrelevant external circumstances.
An intoxicated driver stopped at an intersection who unknowingly accelerated into a
pedestrian would likely be found guilty, for a jury unaware of intoxication would
likely infer knowledge or purpose. An identically intoxicated driver racing along a
highway who unknowingly sideswiped another car would likely be found innocent,
for a jury unaware of intoxication would likely infer negligence. Why would a
legislature want to write a statute that draws such a distinction, upon which a
sentence of life imprisonment, or death, may tum? If the legislature wanted to equate
voluntary intoxication, knowledge, and purpose, why would it not write a statute that
plainly says so, instead of doing so in a roundabout manner that would affect, in
dramatically different ways, those whose minds, deeds, and consequences seem
identical? I would reserve the question of whether or not such a hypothetical statute
might exceed constitutional limits. Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85-86
(1986); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,210 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 698-699 (1975). [italics in original]

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 79-80.
It may be that the federal Constitution does not defend "We, the People" from being

convicted for the worst possible thoughts regardless of whether those thoughts occurred so long as
intoxication was present at the time of an action. Fortunately, Idaho need not follow it down every
crooked corridor. The Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 299 (1988),
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that "[t]he Idaho Constitution can, where appropriate, grant more protection than its federal
counterpart."
The Idaho Constitution guarantees Due Process to a criminal defendant under Article I § 13.
Idaho's courts have a long history of maintaining a strict demarcation between the state and the
defense burdens at a criminal trial despite decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicating
that some burden shifting is acceptable. See ICJI Introduction and General Directions for Use, citing

Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); State v. Huggins,
105 Idaho 43 (1983); State v. Gratiot, l 04 Idaho 782 (1983); State v. Hansen, l 05 Idaho 816 (1983);

State v. Myers, 94 Idaho 570 (1972); State v. Copenbarger, 52 Idaho 441 (1932); State v. Lundhigh,
30 Idaho 365 (1917); State v. Rogers, 30 Idaho 259 (1917). The courts of Idaho have never even
permitted a defendant to bear the burden of persuasion for an affirmative defense. They certainly
have never allowed elements of a crime to be eviscerated on the basis of some other "wrong." When
the Idaho Supreme Court upheld LC.§ 18-207 in State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 125 (2012), the
Court relied in part on the fact that insanity remained relevant to the existence of mens rea. The
Court held:
Idaho case law has found no abridgement of due process by LC. § 18-207, due in part
to the surrounding statutory framework. For example, under LC. § 18-201(2), a
person who has committed a criminal act without being conscious of it is legally
incapable of committing a crime. In this context, the opinions referenced by Delling
do not appear to question the wisdom of the statutes or the interpreting opinions.
Additionally, as expounded upon below, evidence of mental illness is expressly
allowed and can rebut the element of intent. As such, we hold that Delling's right to
due process is not infringed by the abolition of the insanity defense.

Id. at 715. As the District Court in this matter would hold, however, the Idaho Supreme Court
actually had previously held in State v. Gish, 87 Idaho 341, 351 (1964) overruled in part on other
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grounds by State v. White, 93 Idaho 153 (1969), that LC. § 18-201 (2) did not contemplate the insane
or voluntarily intoxicated. At the time, of course, insanity was an affirmative defense. The Court's
ruling in Delling therefore should be read to indicate that while insanity or voluntary intoxication
cannot support an affirmative defense to overcome general intent, they remain relevant to the jury's
finding that a specific intent or knowledge existed. However, the ruling also indicates that were the
legislature to make a law that made insanity irrelevant to intent, that law would be unconstitutional.
Also, unlike the federal Constitution, Idahoans have no history ofindiscriminately punishing
acts coupled with thoughts the same as those coupled with a drunken haze. See State v. Sprouse, 63
Idaho 166 (1941); State v. Morrison, 52 Idaho 99, 11 P. 619,621 (1932) (drunk defendant would at
least be guilty of manslaughter if acted "when he did not know what he was doing"); State v.

Smailes, 51 Idaho 321 (1931) (relying on C.S. § 8089); State v. Rigley, 7 Idaho 292, 62 P. 679
(1900). The early Idaho Supreme Court treated such levels of intoxication as a species of insanity.

See Rigley, 62 P. at 679 ("The kind of alcoholic insanity which simply tends to accelerate the party in
seeking revenge .. is a very different disease that that which is motiveless, and results in a mere
"delirious fancy and a muscle raised obedient to its impulse."). Moreover, the courts ofldaho and its
laws have long required that all crimes, except for "public welfare" offenses, must have a mens rea
component. See Haxforth v. State, 117 Idaho 189, 190-91 (Ct.App.1990); LC.§ 18-114. In the face
of this jurisprudential history, there is no support for a law that declares evidence as to mens rea
irrelevant so long as voluntary intoxication is established.
LC. § 18-116 goes beyond LC. § 18-207 by specifically eliminating the relevance of
intoxication to mens rea. In so doing, it essentially allows the state to prove crimes meant to reflect
the depravity of the choices made by the accused without there ever having been a choice. In this
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case, the state argued that if the jury found the defendant had been voluntarily intoxicated, then his
intoxication could not be taken into account in determining his intent or knowledge. To say that
what occurred was just, fair, or in any way provided the process which is due, is to essentially ignore
not only reality, but Idaho's commitment to holding the state to its burden. The statute therefore
violates Art. I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution by lessening the burden on the state by making
irrelevant salient and important facts thereby rejecting the long recognized mens rea requirement for
criminal offenses on the basis of a mental state that in turn has always been recognized as being
relevant to the issue: intoxication. The defendant may have battered a police officer, but LC. § 18915 was never intended to brand the violently drunk as felons. The law was meant for those who
would choose to fight the police for doing their job. See 2001 Idaho Laws Ch. 181 (H.B. 65)
(Statement of Purpose). Mr. Kelly is not one of those people, and he has been labeled one only
because in this case the state was not required to prove that he was such a person. The conviction
should be reversed.
E. IfI.C. § 18-116 is constitutional, then the defendant was entitled to a self-defense instruction.
A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on every defense or theory of defense
having any support in the evidence. State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 328 (Ct.App.1999). However,
requested jury instructions should not be given if they lack support in the facts of the case or are
erroneous statements of the law. State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 941 (1994); State v. Bronnenberg,
124 Idaho 67, 71 (Ct.App.1993). LC.§ 19-2132(a) requires that the trial court must provide to the
jury being charged "all matters oflaw necessary for their information" and must give a requested jury
instruction if it determines that instruction to be correct and pertinent. Under a four-part test, a
requested instruction must be given where: (1) it properly states the governing law; (2) a reasonable
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view of the evidence would support the defendant's legal theory; (3) it is not addressed adequately by
other jury instructions; and (4) it does not constitute an impermissible comment as to the evidence.
State v. Fetterly, 126 Idaho 475, 476-77 (Ct.App.1994); see also State v. Evans, 119 Idaho 383,385

(Ct.App.1991). To meet the second prong of this test, the defendant must present at least some
evidence supporting his or her theory and any support will suffice as long as his or her theory
comports with a reasonable view of the evidence. Fetterly, 126 Idaho at 476-77; State v. Kodesh,
122 Idaho 756, 758 (Ct.App.1992). In other words, a defendant must present facts to support each
element of a prima facie case for each defense. State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66
(Ct.App.2000). If the defendant fails to provide evidence supporting any one of the necessary
elements of a defense, the defendant has failed to meet his or her burden and is not entitled to have
the jury instructed on that defense.
Assuming for a moment that it is constitutional for the state to simply relieve itself of its
burden in cases involving intoxication, then according to the dictates of fundamental fairness, the
same should apply to the defense. See Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130 (2009); State v. Lewis, 144
Idaho 64 (2007). If the defendant can now be assigned whatever mens rea the prosecutor can dream
of, why not also whatever mens rea required by an affirmative defense?

The principle of

fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process clause of the Idaho Constitution Art. I § 13
requires that the defendant be capable of providing a defense. See State v. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64, 65
(2007) ("Fundamental fairness requires a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense ... ");
Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139. If it is constitutional for the state to simply deny the defendant a

complete defense to a serious felony by creating the irrebuttable presumption that he has the
necessary mens rea because of his intoxication (which is not, in and of itself, an element of the
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offense), then that presumption must be a two-way street. Thus, to the extent that LC. § 18-116
creates this irrebuttable presumption only for mental elements of the offense it is unconstitutional.
In this case, a man screaming about pain in his arm between chokes and sobs struck an officer
trying to get him to sit in a vehicle. It is certainly plausible that the defendant's alcohol-soaked brain
perceived some imminent threat of bodily harm. An instruction on self-defense requires that the
defendant have thought he was threatened with imminent bodily harm, that the action taken was
necessary to save himself, and that the danger and the action taken appear reasonable to a person in a
like position. See ICJI 1517. Since he was intoxicated and the law evidently presumes whatever
mental state is required existed, there is no reason for the District Court to have refused the defense's
requested instruction No. 2 as to self-defense. Would a reasonable person drunk beyond rational
cognition have thought it necessary to defend himself? Either the answer must be yes, because the
law declares the intoxicated have all possible mens rea, or it does not matter so long as one is
voluntarily intoxicated. Thus, the defendant was entitled to the instruction on self-defense.

F. Battery on certain personnel is a lesser included offense of battery on a police officer.
The Idaho Code requires a court to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense if a party
requests the instruction and there is a reasonable view of the facts supporting a finding that the
defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense. State v. Drennon, 126 Idaho 346,
352 (Ct.App.1994); LC. § l 9-2132(b ). There are two theories by which an offense may be deemed
a lesser included offense of a greater offense: (1) the statutory theory; and (2) the pleading theory.

State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524 (1997). Under the statutory theory, a crime may be a lesser
included offense if its elements are necessarily included in the greater crime, as the greater crime is
defined by statute. Under the pleading theory, a crime may be a lesser included offense if the
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charging document alleges facts the proof of which necessarily includes proof of the elements of the
lesser included offense. Id.
In this case, both requirements are met. I.C. § 18-915 states in pertinent part:
( 1) Any person who commits a crime provided for in this chapter against or upon a ..
police officer.. and the perpetrator knows or has reason to know of the victim's status,
the punishment shall be as follows:
(a) For committing battery with intent to commit a serious felony the punishment
shall be imprisonment in the state prison not to exceed twenty-five (25) years.
(b) For committing any other crime in this chapter the punishment shall be doubled
that provided in the respective section, except as provided in subsections (2) and (3)
of this section.
(3) For committing a violation of the provisions of section 18-903, Idaho Code,
except unlawful touching as described in section 18-903(b), Idaho Code, against the
person of a former or present peace officer, sheriff or police officer:
(a) Because of the exercise of official duty or because of the victim's former or
present official status; or
(b) While the victim is engaged in the performance of his duties and the person
committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that such victim is a peace
officer, sheriff or police officer;
the offense shall be a felony punishable by imprisonment in a correctional facility for
a period of not more than five (5) years, and said sentence shall be served
consecutively to any sentence being currently served.
These two sections have been labeled Battery upon Certain Personnel and Battery on a Present or
Former Police officer. See ICJI 1212B, 12121. The elements of Battery upon Certain Personnel
include (1) committing a battery (2) on a person who is a former or present police officer (3) the
defendant knew or had reason to know the victim was a former or present police officer. The
elements of Batter on a Present or Former Police Officer are the same, except that in addition the
state must prove either (1) that the defendant struck the victim because of his status (2) that the
victim was engaged in his duties at the time of the striking or (3) that the defendant struck the victim

because ofhis exercise of his official duties. As argued above in Part 11.C., the defendant necessarily
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must have known of the duties for a conviction to be possible. Thus, the offense is a lesser included.
The District Court erroneously found that because Battery on a Present or Former Police
Officer does not include mere touching, that only in cases involving mere touching could the lesser
included instruction be given. On the contrary, the mere touching exception is merely a bar or
defense to the felony. It did not render Battery upon Certain Personnel unable to defend police from
being battered in cases not involving the attacker's specific intent to attack the officer because of
who he is and/or what he does. Therefore, the Court erred in denying the defendant's requested jury
instructions No. 4 and 6.
CONCLUSION
The case before this Court is a case of elements gone awry. From Battery to Battery on
Certain Personnel to Battery on Law Enforcement requires a steady addition of elements to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. The City of Coeur d'Alene removed duties from its
officers. The state legislature removed mens rea as an element in cases of voluntary intoxication
regardless of the extent. The result: a law intended to punish those who would purposefully engage
in violence against law enforcement is used to ruin the life of a man who in his drunken state was so
pathetic that even the officers involved thought the best thing to do was help him get home. Society
had an interest in seeing him punished. But it has no interest in labeling and punishing him in a
manner that is so utterly indifferent to his character.
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